The biggest detractor to Single Sign On is the same thing that makes it so appealing – you only need to prove your identity once. This scares the hell out of some people because if you can compromise a users session in one application it's possible to affect other applications. Congratulations: checking your Facebook profile just caused your online store to delete all it's orders. Let's break that attack down a little.
- You just signed into Facebook and checked your [insert something to check here] from some friend. That contained a link to something malicious.
- You click the link, and it opens a page that contains an iframe. The iframe points to a URL for your administration portal of the online store with a couple parameters in the query string telling the store to delete all the incoming orders.
- At this point you don't have a session with the administration portal and in a pre-SSO world it would redirect you to a login page. This would stop most attacks because either a) the iframe is too small to show the page, or b) (hopefully) the user is smart enough to realize that a link from a friend on Facebook shouldn't redirect you to your online store's administration portal. In a post-SSO world, the portal would redirect you to the STS of choice and that STS already has you signed in (imagine what else could happen in this situation if you were using Facebook as your identity provider).
- So you've signed into the STS already, and it doesn't prompt for credentials. It redirects you to the administration page you were originally redirected away from, but this time with a session. The page is pulled up, the query string parameters are parsed, and the orders are deleted.
There are certainly ways to stop this as part of this is a bit trivial. For instance you could pop up an Ok/Cancel dialog asking "are you sure you want to delete these?", but for the sake of discussion lets think of this at a high level.
The biggest problem with this scenario is that deleting orders doesn't require anything more than being signed in. By default you had the highest privileges available.
This problem is similar to the problem many users of Windows XP had. They were, by default, running with administrative privileges. This lead to a bunch of problems because any application running could do whatever it pleased on the system. Malware was rampant, and worse, users were just doing all around stupid things because they didn't know what they were doing but they had the permissions necessary to do it.
The solution to that problem is to give users non-administrative privileges by default, and when something required higher privileges you have to re-authenticate and temporarily run with the higher privileges. The key here is that you are running temporarily with higher privileges. However, security lost the argument and Microsoft caved while developing Windows Vista creating User Account Control (UAC). By default a user is an administrator, but they don't have administrative privileges. Their user token is a stripped down administrator token. You only have non-administrative privileges. In order to take full advantage of the administrator token, a user has to elevate and request the full token temporarily. This is a stop-gap solution though because it's theoretically possible to circumvent UAC because the administrative token exists. It also doesn't require you to re-authenticate – you just have to approve the elevation.
As more and more things are moving to the web it's important that we don't lose control over privileges. It's still very important that you don't have administrative privileges by default because, frankly, you probably don't need them all the time.
Some web applications are requiring elevation. For instance consider online banking sites. When I sign in I have a default set of privileges. I can view my accounts and transfer money between my accounts. Anything else requires that I re-authenticate myself by entering a private pin. So for instance I cannot transfer money to an account that doesn't belong to me without proving that it really is me making the transfer.
There are a couple ways you can design a web application that requires privilege elevation. Lets take a look at how to do it with Claims Based Authentication and WIF.
First off, lets look at the protocol. Out of the box WIF supports the WS-Federation protocol. The passive version of the protocol supports a query parameter of wauth. This parameter defines how authentication should happen. The values for it are mostly specific to each STS however there are a few well-defined values that the SAML protocol specifies. These values are passed to the STS to tell it to authenticate using a particular method. Here are some most often used:
When you pass one of these values to the STS during the signin request, the STS should then request that particular type of credential. the wauth parameter supports arbitrary values so you can use whatever you like. So therefore we can create a value that tells the STS that we want to re-authenticate because of an elevation request.
All you have to do is redirect to the STS with the wauth parameter:
Once the user has re-authenticated you need to tell the relying party some how. This is where the Authentication Method claim comes in handy:
Just add the claim to the output identity:
protected override IClaimsIdentity GetOutputClaimsIdentity(IClaimsPrincipal principal, RequestSecurityToken request, Scope scope)
IClaimsIdentity ident = principal.Identity as IClaimsIdentity;
ident.Claims.Add(new Claim(ClaimTypes.AuthenticationMethod, "urn:super:secure:elevation:method"));
// finish filling claims...
At that point the relying party can then check to see whether the method satisfies the request. You could write an extension method like:
public static bool IsElevated(this IClaimsPrincipal principal)
return principal.Identity.AuthenticationType == "urn:super:secure:elevation:method";
And then have a bit of code to check:
var p = Thread.CurrentPrincipal as IClaimsPrincipal;
if (p != null && p.IsElevated())
This satisfies half the requirements for elevating privilege. We need to make it so the user is only elevated for a short period of time. We can do this in an event handler after the token is received by the RP. In Global.asax we could do something like:
void Application_Start(object sender, EventArgs e)
+= new EventHandler<SessionSecurityTokenReceivedEventArgs>
void SessionAuthenticationModule_SessionSecurityTokenReceived(object sender,
= new SessionSecurityToken(e.SessionToken.ClaimsPrincipal, e.SessionToken.Context,
e.SessionToken = token;
This will check to see if the incoming token has been elevated, and if it has, set the lifetime of the token to 15 minutes.
There are other places where this could occur like within the STS itself, however this value may need to be independent of the STS.
As I said earlier, as more and more things are moving to the web it's important that we don't lose control of privileges. By requiring certain types of authentication in our relying parties, we can easily support elevation by requiring the STS to re-authenticate.
Every couple of weeks I start up Autoruns to see what new stuff has added itself to Windows startup and what not (screw you Adobe – you as a software company make me want to swear endlessly). Anyway, a few months ago around the time the latest version of Windows Live Messenger and it’s suite RTM’ed I poked around to see if anything new was added. Turns out there was:
A new credential provider was added!
Not only that, it turns out a couple Winsock providers were added too:
I started poking around the DLL’s and noticed that they don’t do much. Apparently you can use smart cards for WLID authentication. I suspect that’s what the credential provider and associated Winsock Provider is for, as well as part of WLID’s sign-on helper so credentials can be managed via the Credential Manager:
Ah well, nothing too exciting here.
Skip a few months and something occurred to me. Microsoft was able to solve part of the Claims puzzle. How do you bridge the gap between desktop application identities and web application identities? They did part of what CardSpace was unable to do because CardSpace as a whole didn’t really solve a problem people were facing. The problem Windows Live ran into was how do you share credentials between desktop and web applications without constantly asking for the credentials? I.e. how do you do Single Sign On…
This got me thinking.
What if I wanted to step this up a smidge and instead of logging into Windows Live Messenger with my credentials, why not log into Windows with my Windows Live Credentials?
Yes, Windows. I want to change this:
Question: What would this solve?
Answer: At present, nothing ground-breakingly new. For the sake of argument, lets look at how this would be done, and I’ll (hopefully) get to my point.
First off, we need to know how to modify the Windows logon screen. In older versions of Windows (versions older than 2003 R2) you had to do a lot of heavy lifting to make any changes to the screen. You had to write your own GINA which involved essentially creating your own UI. Talk about painful.
With the introduction of Vista, Microsoft changed the game when it came to custom credentials. Their reasoning was simple: they didn’t want you to muck up the basic look and feel. You had to follow their guidelines.
As a result we are left with something along the lines of these controls to play with:
The logon screen is now controlled by Credential Providers instead of the GINA. There are two providers built into Windows by default, one for Kerberos or NTLM authentication, and one for Smart Card authentication.
The architecture looks like:
When the Secure Attention Sequence (CTRL + ALT + DEL / SAS) is called, Winlogon switches to a different desktop and instantiates a new instance of LogonUI.exe. LogonUI enumerates all the credential provider DLL’s from registry and displays their controls on the desktop.
When I enter in my credentials they are serialized and supposed to be passed to the LSA.
Once the LSA has these credentials it can then do the authentication.
I say “supposed” to be passed to the LSA because there are two frames of thought here. The first frame is to handle authentication within the Credential Provider itself. This can cause problems later on down the road. I’ll explain why in the second frame.
The second frame of thought is when you need to use custom credentials, need to do some funky authentication, and then save save the associated identity token somewhere. This becomes important when other applications need your identity.
You can accomplish this via what’s called an Authentication Package.
When a custom authentication package is created, it has to be designed in such a way that applications cannot access stored credentials directly. The applications must go through the pre-canned MSV1_0 package to receive a token.
Earlier when I asked about using Windows Live for authentication we would need to develop two things: a Credential Provider, and a custom Authentication Package.
The logon process would work something like this:
- Select Live ID Credential Provider
- Type in Live ID and Password and submit
- Credential Provider passes serialized credential structure to Winlogon
- Winlogon passes credentials to LSA
- LSA passes credential to Custom Authentication Package
- Package connects to Live ID STS and requests a token with given credentials
- Token is returned
- Authentication Package validated token and saves it to local cache
- Package returns authentication result back up call stack to Winlogon
- Winlogon initializes user’s profile and desktop
I asked before: What would this solve?
This isn’t really a ground-breaking idea. I’ve just described a domain environment similar to what half a million companies have already done with Active Directory, except the credential store is Live ID.
On it’s own we’ve just simplified the authentication process for every home user out there. No more disparate accounts across multiple machines. Passwords are in sync, and identity information is always up to date.
What if Live ID sets up a new service that lets you create access groups for things like home and friends and you can create file shares as appropriate. Then you can extend the Windows 7 Homegroup sharing based on those access groups.
Wait, they already have something like that with Skydrive (sans Homegroup stuff anyway).
Maybe they want to use a different token service.
Imagine if the user was able to select the “Federated User” credential provider that would give you a drop down box listing a few Security Token Services. Azure ACS can hook you up.
Imagine if one of these STS’s was something everyone used *cough* Facebook *cough*.
Imagine the STS was one that a lot of sites on the internet use *cough* Facebook *cough*.
Imagine if the associated protocol used by the STS and websites were modified slightly to add a custom set of headers sent to the browser. Maybe it looked like this:
Finally, imagine if your browser was smart enough to intercept those headers and look up the user’s token, check if they matched the header ”Relying-Party-Accepting-Token-Type” and then POST the token to the given reply URL.
Hmm. We’ve just made the internet SSO capable.
Now to just move everyone’s cheese to get this done.